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Since the mid-1990s China has undergone an explosive growth in Internet usage and
coverage. China became the second largest Internet nation (next to the United States) in
2002, with 59.1 million Internet users. By June 2006, the number hit 123 million (although
this still comprises only 9.4 per cent of China's total population of 1.3 billion).] The Inter-
net has become an integral part of the daily lives of urban Chinese. For most Chinese Inter-
net users, the Internet provides aggregated sources of a rich variety of content: a platform
for online commerce, a huge virtual billboard for advertisements, games and social net-
working (including cyberlove, or wang lion).
This entertainment-and-consumption pattern of Internet use at the micro, individual
level is often put side by side with a control model at the macro, institutional level,
which views information and communication technologies (lCT) as a means of control
(see, for example, Qiu, 2007). People in the West are frequently told about the suppression
of freedom of speech by the Chinese government, constraints on politically sensitive web-
sites, arrests of cyber activists, and global Internet search companies (such as Google,
Yahoo and MSN) giving in to the Chinese government by imposing stricter censorship
to control the flow of Internet information. Both the micro and macro perspectives on
Chinese ICT are at the same time counterbalanced by a meso-level view that takes the
Internet as a tool for political activism and a platform for democratisation (see, for
example, Schroeder, 2005). The use of the Internet as a tool for political activism has
characterised overseas Chinese political movements, such as the Uyghur opposition move-
ment (representing cyber-separatism) (see Gladney, 2(04) and the Falun Gong protest
movement (representing cyber-sectarianism) (Thornton, 2(02). The macro and meso per-
spectives are usually intertwined with each other, as the use of the Internet by dissidents
and control of the Internet by the Chinese government are regarded as two sides of the
same coin (Chase and Mulvenon, 2002).
The apparent dichotomy of control versus freedom has constituted the internal logic of
China's ICT development and dominated Western scholarship on Chinese new media.
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Recently, however, a socio-political economy model has been developed that trics to embed
China's state-led and market-driven "digital revolution" or "great digital leap forward" :2
within the broader developmental path of China's post-socialist era. From this perspective,
China's ICT development is not only significant within the context of global isat ion, but also
critical to the social and cultural domains of Chinese modernity. Yuezhi Zhao (2007), for
example, examines the aggressive top-down "digital revolution" side by side with the enor-
mous social and cultural tensions represented by industrial workers, farmers, and Falun
Gong members - all subaltern subjects in relation to the elite nature of Chinese ICT pro-
moters and users. For Zhao, these subaltern subjects have been "at the forefront of contest-
ing the terms of China's 'digital revolution"', and they represent the "unevenness and
incommensurability of the digital age" (Zhao, 2007, p. 113).
Zhao's article underscores the interface between the economic, political, and
socio-cultural dimensions of ICT in China. She emphasises the interaction of the meso
and macro levels of ICT in China - that is, the interaction of the state-led and
market-oriented leT developmental strategy and the multiple forms of social contesta-
tion that such a strategy creates. In this integrated study of Chinese ICT, the "everyday"
is ubiquitous. The central role of the everyday dimension in the interplay between the
micro, meso and macro levels in Chinese Internet culture, however, has not yet been
fully investigated. Chinese Internet development in recent years, particularly the fast
growth of blogging since 2002, has posed new questions about digital media practices
by new consumer-cum-producers (or "prosumers") and their embedding in contemporary
Chinese culture. While giving us glimpses of contemporary Chinese Internet culture,
their blogging practices also invite an investigation into the cultural politics of the every-
day in China.
I have demonstrated elsewhere that, despite the increasingly sophisticated effort by the
Chinese government to control the Internet, the new media can become a new venue for
individuals to exercise citizenship, not through overt resistance, but through a process of
re-subjectification via mediated expression, social interaction, and circulation of their own
media stories (Yu, 2006; 2007). As cultural producers (as well as consumers), these new
media users use mobile texting and online posting to form a culture of circulation in the act
of consumption. The seemingly apolitical media practices of the consumer masses turned
out to be political in the end as they influenced the way people think about politics, culture
and society. This article continues my previous studies on the popular and everyday
dimension of new media usage in China. It focuses on a relatively new phenomenon in
Chinese Internet culture - blogging.
The year 2005 is regarded as the year of Chinese blogging. First, two of the largest
Chinese-language commercial Internet service providers (ISPs), called sina.com and
sohu.com, together with bokee.com (one of the major players in Chinese blogosphere -
a collective term of all blogs) sponsored competitions 10 stimulate blogging among
Chinese Internet users. Next, a series of "blogger events" lOok place that further justified
the celebration of the coming of age of Chinese bloggers. This included production of a
bloggers' online movie 'A Hard Day's Night,3 and an online video called 'A Bloody
Case Caused by a Steamed Bun [mantou]" which set out to spoof the 2005 blockbuster,
The Promise, by famed film producer Chen Kaige.4 These events provide a rich context
in which to explore the phenomenon of blogging in everyday Chinese Internet culture.
In this study I will focus on these cases in order to assess the new development of
digital media practices in the context of everyday politics in China.
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B10gging in China
Blogging is a creative textual-visual-audio posting and viewing practice. Blo!.!s often
combine text, images and links to other blogs, webpages, and other media related to
their topics; they can be textual, visual (photoblog, vlog), or audio (podcasting). Blogs
often provide commentary or news on a particular subject, such as food, politics or
local news. Some function as personal online diaries; others function as social forums
and part of a wider network of social media. In other words, blogging represents a new
way of living.
Blogging started in China in 2002 with the initial operation ofblogchina.com in August.
II quickly took off in 2003 when Mu Zimei started her web diary at blogcn.com to record
and publicise her very active sex life with different men.s Blogging became the hOllest
keyword in Chinese search engines with the popularisation of Mu Zimei and her blog.
In May 2004, the first conference on online communication (with particular focus on
blogging) in China was held in Nanjing. By the end of 2005, blogging was no longer
simply an online practice for a small group of elite Internet users; it had been popularised
and become a way of living for urban Chinese.6
By the end of 2005 the number of Chinese bloggers had reached 16 million, while the
total number of Internet users had reached III million (Zhang, 2006).7 According to a
survey on blogging in China, by June 2006 the number of Chinese bloggers had
reached 17.485 million, or 14.2 per cent of China's total 123 million Internet users, and
the number of Chinese blog readers had reached 75.565 million, or 61.4 per cent of the
total Internet population in China (CNNIC, 2006).
The year 2005 has been claimed as a milestone year in the short history of blogging in
China, not only because of its rapid growth in terms of number and popularisation among
Chinese Internet users, but also because of its impact on everyday life. In blogging, com-
modity culture (manifested as consumption) and knowledge culture (manifested as media
production) have combined to form a new Internet culture, which in turn reflects the
general trend of cultural transformation in China today.
The first case to be examined here is the group bloggers' movie 'A Hard Day's Night'.
'A Hard Day's Night' is a 50-minute long digital video, made by a group of bloggers in
Beijing who got together offline and decided to make a movie to enjoy themselves and
poke fun at each other and their lives. They claim to have zero specialty and profession-
alism (in filmmaking), zero sincerity, zero special effects, zero logic, and zero box sales.
The movie tells of the misfortune suffered by a man named Xiao Qing who works for a
blogging website. He is detained by the police on his way home one night for his resem-
blance to a legendary Hong Kong actor-turned-bank robber. What distinguishes the movie
is not its thematic matter (it does not have any theme) or its editorial technique (it is shot
with only one home digital camera and edited on an old computer), but the way in which
these blogger-actor-producers produce and promote their product and the spirit of play-
fulness embodied in the movie.
Claimed as embodying "entertainment for entertainment's sake" (rather than the
official ideology of "education through entertainment" in media production), 'A Hard
Day's Night' is a mischievous prank by a group of bloggers. 8 As an olfshoot of blogging,
the movie was promoted offline by these first-time "movie-makers" through a mock-Oscar
ceremony on 5 January 2006, which was attended by all movie-making participants (who
were all prize-winners) and their friends and associates in Beijing's media circle. It was
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again publicised online through blogging when the blogger-playwright-actor-
director-producers returned to their individual blogs to write about their experience in
making the movie, employing the same kind of playful, hippy spirit that characterises con-
versations throughout their movie. This spirit can be traced back, most recently, to popular
satirist Wang Slmo, whose rebellious spirit and satirical writing have earned him the title
"hooligan [/ium(/ng] writer" (Barme, 1992). The playful spirit has been used as a trade-
mark in the marketing and publicity endeavours of the moviemaker-bloggers. As one of
them writes, "In the age when people live a boring and unexciting life, we did something
entertaining with a playful spirit" (Lao Liu, 2006). In doing so, these bloggers deny any
political purpose or even innuendo in making the movie, allhough references to contem-
porary Chinese politics infuse the whole movie. Their playful spirit quickly spread in the
Chinese Internet, among their blog readers, their fans, and fans' fans. 'A Hard Day's
Night' became an online spectacle at the end of 2005 and in early 2006.
At almost the same time, a spoof of the feature movie The Promise (2006) by famed film
producer Chen Kaige caused a sensation in the Chinese Internet. This spoof, entitled'A
Bloody Case Caused by a Steamed Bun' (hereafter 'Steamed Bun') was made by Hu
Ge, a blogger and amateur digital video producer based in Shanghai, to mock Chen
Kaige's blockbuster. Like 'A Hard Day's Night', it was made in December 2005 and
was widely circulated online in January 2006, just weeks after the official release of
Chen's film in China.
The 20-minute long DV borrows video footage from The Promise but infuses it into the
format of 'China Legal Report', a legal education program by China Central Television
(CCTV). It tells a story about the police investigating a murder case, using the format,
style and language of the CCTV legal program. Even the insertion of advertisements in
the program copies that of 'China Legal Report'. It starts with the typical opening style
of the official legal program:
One lillIe steamed bun caused an astonishing murder case. The nature of innocent
kids was twisted by a little incident (over fighting for a steamed bun) ... The
police were ordered to find and arrest the murder suspect ... The case proved to
be very intriguing and complicated. Welcome to the end of year 2005 special
issue of 'China Legal Report' - 'A Bloody Case Caused by a Steamed Bun'
(video excerpt, 'Steamed Bun').
The tone of the narrator is serious (as is that of the official CCTV version); the plot and
message the DV carries, however, are characterised by mockery, paradox, sarcasm and
deliberate misuse and misinterpretation of mainstream ideology. 'Steamed Bun' mocks
the "sublime" and "grand" (represented by The Promise) and the "official" and
"serious" (CCTV's 'China Legal Report') through its "se,:iously comical" narration of a
mundane case caused by a triangular love affair. The power of the spoof is further
enhanced by Hu's skilful manoeuvring of various forms of music in editing the DV,
ranging through Western (rap), folk ('Love Song from Tea Mountain'), popular
('Cinderella') and mainstream ('Entering the New Era').
Unlike the case of 'A Hard Day's Night', Hu Ge never intended to publicise his DV, and
was even surprised when the DV became a popular hit just a couple of days after it was
posted online by his friends. 'Steamed Bun' quickly generated a fan community. These
fans of 'Steamed Bun', also known as "m(/I1IOU fan" or steamed buns, posted articles,
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made posters, and blogged 'Steamed Bun' in their websites, forums and blogs to spread the
spoof, and support Hu Ge in his artistic experiment, especially when Chen Kaige threa-
tened to sue Hu over intellectual property issues.9 Hu had not intended to create a stir
but he reluctal1\ly became an "anti-fan" artist. In this way he was seen to represent the
larger body of amateur online film and video production that had arisen in China with
the emergence of easily accessible digital video technology and blogging. He is "anti-
fan" because he is not a DV artist seeking to promote fandom of the film. Hu produced
a whole new storyline by patching together the original footage in the film with totally
different and anti-climactic dialogues and narration. The effect was to mock and decon-
struct the original film and its thematic matter. He is also "anti-fan" because he was
never interested in joining or forming any fandom community. It is the Internet and par-
ticularly blogging that gave his spoof its rapid and widespread circulation and a surprising
degree of public visibility. As "Steamed Buns" became a synonym for "e 'gao" or spoof,
Hu became an Internet celebrity, representing the spirit of the grassroots [cao gen]
majori ty.
The "grassroots spirit" is the spirit of the masses as consumers and amateur producers of
media products.]t represents the essence of everyday life and the energy ofblogging culture.
]n both cases, blogging has become an essential pm1 of everyday life for those who blog, as
blog writers and readers. No matter how these bloggers use blogs, blogging - an online prac-
tice of knowledge culture - has altered the way in which consumer culture operates. The
following passage is bOITowed from Henry Jenkins (2002) as a snapshot of my following
discussion on blogging and its relation to everyday cultural consumption and production:
In an era marked both by the expanded corporate reach of the commodity culture and
the emerging importance of grassroots knowledge culture, consumer power may
now be best exercised by blogging rather than jamming media signals (Jenkins,
2002, p. 168).
Blogging Everyday Life
Many theorists, from Henri Lefebvre and Pierre Bourdieu to Michel de Certeau, have
theorised everyday life and consumption. Everyday life has started to occupy a central pos-
ition in the study of media and media technologies (e.g. Silverstone and Hirsch, 1994;
Mackey, 1997). These earlier studies have succeeded in turning "away from the habit of
thinking in terms of what the media do to people", to use James Halloran's often quoted
remark, towards the idea of "what people do with the media" (qtd. in Morley, 1992,
p. 51). Consumption is no longer considered a domain of "passivity" but has become
central to the cultural production of a symbolic order of everyday life and politics. This
is a salient feature of pos/modernity. ]n postmodernity, consumption has become part of
self-construction and a process of popular resistance. As Fuat Firat and Nikhilesh Dholakia
(1998) aptly summarise,
]n modernity, the subject (the consumer being) encounters the objects (products) as
distinct and distances from her/himself. ]n postmodern consumption, the consumer
renders products part of her/himself, becoming part of the experience of being with
products (Firat and Dholakia, 1998, pp. 96-97).
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This postmodern view of consumption has also characterised studies of consumption in
Asia such as Chua (2000). These studies have demonstrated how the social, political, econ-
omic and cultural dimensions of consumption underpin the identity politics of the emer-
gent middle class. In the Chinese case, digital gadgets such as mobile phones were
associated with the power and identity of the new rich in the early 1990s (Goodman,
1996). By the time blogging took off in China in 2003, however, around 250 million
Chinese, or one out of every five people, owned a mobile phone (People'.\" Daily,
2003). Digital devices such as mobile phones and the Internef are no longer mere
symbols of the latest fashion but everyday channels of communication, entertainment
and networking. Consumption, especially consumption of new media, has become part
of the experience of being reassuringly modern for urban Chinese.
In the era before the new media became an everyday reality for urban Chinese, people were
mainly regarded as consumers who might actively decode media messages but were not
equipped to narrate their own stories and make their voices heard and "enlarged" through
circulation. In the era of new media and communication, however, new forms of "public-
ness" are created based on non-localised, non-corporal, non-dialogic, and non-reciprocal
forms of communication across national and cultural boundaries. Mobility and mobilisation
are privatised via mediated quasi-interactions among different fOl111$ of "publicness"
(Thompson, 1995). Communication becomes versatile, immediate, and more democratising
in that ordinary people can log onto a BBS to read or post social commentary, use their mobile
phones to talk and send a synopsis of issues of common concern, or blog and reblog texts,
images and sounds, not just across China but in global cyberspace, almost any time and any-
where. These bloggers (and new media users in extension) are not merely spectators or con-
sumers. They are active pm1icipants in the production of symbolic values by being pm1 of a
culture of circulation. Blogs, home-made videos, and spoofs of blockbusters are both banal
and ubiquitous, and represent a postmodern pattern of consumption-cum-production.
Blogging empowers people to take coordinated actions based on mutual trust and SUppOJ1,
as my two case studies (and numerous other cases) have suggested. The producers of 'A
Hard Day's Night' deliberately used blogging to spread their message offun and playfulness.
The bloggers who formed the community of "/1Iall10u fan" to support Hu Ge and his
'Steamed Bun' spoof were well aware of their influence. The coordinated actions by
the bloggers to network and circulate their work may not be considered political, or even
confrontational, but rather eff0l1s by amateur media producers to play with words and
audio-video resources to offer alternative messages to the Chinese public.
As a form of knowledge production and circulation, blogging also represents a rebel-
lious force in the new media culture, which is an essential part of the emergent knowledge
culture. It derives from the old commodity culture, but deconstructs it from inside. As
Pierre Levy (1997) points out, the emergent knowledge culture is gradually altering the
ways in which the commodity culture operates. Although knowledge culture cannot
operate outside the commodity culture, the former, which emerged from popular new
media use, serves as the "invisible and intangible engine" to propel the dismantlement
of the order of the old commodity culture (Levy, 1997, p. 237). This observation is
supported by Mark Poster (2004) when he points out:
Here the older legal and economic structures that insure commodification on the
basis of authorship are disintegrating before our eyes. Copyright law, designed for
an age when cultural objects were material commodities like cars and cereals,
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is now an obstacle to the development of a post postmodern culture, one no longer
characterized by fixed cultural objects and positions of creator and consumer, but by
fluid text, sounds and images, costless reproduction and distribution, and potentially
collective creation (Poster, 2004, p. 421).
The culture industry can resist consumer creativity. In the case of 'Steamed Bun', Chen
Kaige threatened to sue Hu Ge, who, fearing for his financial future, apologised to Chen
for his spoof of The Promise. Hu's "maI110U" fans, however, continued tlieir support of
him and urged him to further his digital experimentation by feeding him ideas for other
spoofs. One can see from this that the knowledge culture (to continue using Levy's term)
encourages its participants to join in the reading-writing, consumption-circulation-
production continuum. The Internet has played a central role in empowering ordinary
people to narrate and circulate their own media products. ]n this way ordinary people are
able to constitute themselves as active agents in narrating their own stories.
The emergence of the postmodern consumer and the integration of consumption and
production in the cultural domain have characterised discussions on consumption and
everyday life in the era of digital media and communication technologies. ] have used
two cases to demonstrate the effect ofInternet use in China (especially through blogging)
and its contribution to the new media culture and emergent knowledge culture in the
Chinese context. I have viewed blogging as representing the postmodern pattern of
media consumption and production on the one hand, and a rebellious force against the
mainstream culture on the other hand. As a rebellious force, blogging does not,
however, challenge the mainstream culture (be it political or business), but rather decon-
structs it through playful (mis)use (and often juxtaposition) of the available resources.
"Entertainment for entertainment's sake" has become the trademark of Chinese blogging
and serves as a collective manifesto in the Chinese blogosphere. Embodied in their spirit of
playfulness is the refusal of seriousness. This spirit is in itself a tactical form of resistance.
The "Graying" of Chinese Internet Culture
The tactical form of resistance represented by blogging is not a new phenomenon in
Chinese culture. There has been a long string of cultural events in contemporary China
that fall into the category of popular resistance. From Cui Jian's rock-n-roll and Wang
Shuo's "hooligan" novels (as mentioned earlier), to the cultural T-shirt craze that swept
China's capital in the early 1990s (Banne, 1999), a tactical use of language has character-
ised the various forms of popular resistance in contemporary China. As Geremie Barme
observed in the late 1990s,
Since language, or public parole, and reality had for many decades enjoyed at best
only an accidental relationship in China, there was no great difficulty for a creative
artist to engage in an ironic inversion of language (Barme, 1999, p. 174).
He went on to point out that both Wang Shuo's writings and the cultural T-shirts had the
effect of "highlighting the absurdities of both language and the reality it supposedly rep-
resented, playfully working with signs - literally Chinese characters - and meaning as
part of an attempt to reveal what was hidden or perhaps felt behind the facade of
words" (Barme, 1999, p. 174).
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The playful use of words and contemporary Chinese political culture, in the way of
"soft-core deconstruction" (to use Barm€' s words in describing cultural T-shirts), has
been a consistent feature in popular resistance, although people who participate in such
a creative business seldom admit the subversive nature of their work. As already
pointed out, 'A Hard Day's Night' is infused with this same play with words and with
mainstream culture. In the beginning of the film, for example, when Xiao Qiang (the
lead actor) is stopped by the police, the viewer's attention is immediately engaged by
this contemporary version of a Maoist greeting that characterised the height of the Cultural
Revolution:
(Policeman) Adhere to "Three Represents" - please show your ID card;
(Xiao Qiang) Adhere to "Three Closenesses" - please wait a second.
"Three Represents" represents the ideology of the Jiang Zemin regime, while "Three
Closenesses" represents that of the Hu Jintao regime, especially in "thought work" -
that is, ideology and political work. 10 In the short exchange between the policeman and
Xiao Qiang, political correctness is fleshed out. This comical deployment of political
correctness continues as Xiao Qiang, now handcuffed and forcibly taken away, deplores
his tragic fate as an innocent citizen of China:
I support the unification of Taiwan; I voted for Li Yuchun in the Super Girl contest.
You've made a mistake; it's a mistake! It is not me who went to massage parlours for
prostitution; it is not me who caused the explosion of the chemical factory due to his
negligence of duty; it is not me who stopped Faye Wang from singing; it is the
chickens, not me, who spread the bird flu.
This is a farrago of Chinese "political correctness". It refers to mainstream CCP views on
the Taiwan issue, to issues in popular culture, such as "Super Girl", who is a Chinese
version of "American Idol", and the pop star, Faye Wang, who retreated temporarily
from show business due to pregnancy, and to hot social issues such as the anti-corruption
campaign and the social disruption caused by bird flu. The same deployment of political
correctness and comical use of language also characterises 'Steamed Bun', though in a
different way. While 'A Hard Day's Night' features deliberate juxtaposition of contrasts,
nonsensical parodies, and sudden twists in the spoken dialogue, 'Steamed Bun' features
the technique of spoof through a carefully devised plot and a hybrid format rather than
through inventive language.
In both cases, parodies of mainstream ideology, mockeries of blockbusters, and caricature
of hot social issues and persons have characterised the production of spoofs through blog-
ging. The spoof is similar to the Cantonese technique of \vu Ii tou, made popular in mainland
China through such Hong Kong films as Stephen Chow's 1990 hit All for the Winner. The
blogged spoof aims to deconstruct anything serious, grand, sublime and mainstream. It pro-
duces a comic effect through mockery, sarcasm, paradox, irony and subtle subversion. In this
way the word e 'gao [spoof] has become increasingly popular with the spread of blogging in
China, and is used to refer to the popularisation of digital technologies among ordinary
Internet users.
These creative "artists", whether they are professional art producers or ordinary users of
the new media, are not necessarily trying to engage in confrontation with the state. After
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all, they benefit from the opening of Chinese society, the gradual retreat of the state from
the everyday domain of people's lives, and the techno-economic growth under the author-
itarian leaders of the post-1978 reform movement, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu
Jintao. Many of them are state employees, such as the bloggers in 'A Hard Day's
Night', who know the political boundaries of word games in China. Bloggers who
produce and circulate their spoof articles and audio-video products online do not consider
themselves, and are not considered by state authorities, to be opponents of the system.
When Reuters termed 'A Hard Day's Night' a political satire about contemporary
Chinese politics, it annoyed the movie's blogger-producers. One of them wrote in his
blog: "It is inevitable that those foreigners link our entertainment-oriented blogger
movie with political life - nowadays politics has assumed command for foreigners
rather than us [Chinese]" (Anonymous, 2006).11
Different interpretations of Chinese blogger events only highlight different perspectives
and positions of the interpreters in question. While overseas observers are quick to read
political messages into the Chinese blogging practices, Chinese practitioners themselves
are generally reluctant to relate their playful use of language and events to the reality
they supposedly represent. What these bloggers enjoy is not a momentary stardom or
"martyrdom" through creation of the spoof, but the promise of moments of tactical and
light-hearted resistance through playful collective action. This light-hearted resistance,
which forms the core element of Chinese popular culture, has migrated to the online
world with or without state approval.
The rapid growth of blogging and its growing influence on the public has not led to
repression by the state except in cases where political boundaries are blatantly crossed.
Nor have bloggers stopped producing spoof products online, in spite of continual com-
mentaries from overseas observers about their possible political implications. It is not
just evocative words but visual and auditory pleasure that explains the popularity and con-
tinued growth of these amateur spoofs. ]n the early 1990s leaders of the cultural T-shirt
craze (when young people wore T-shirts with ambiguous messages) would say "Life is
a bore", whereas today's bloggers proclaim that "Life is a play". About a decade after
the Internet took off in China, "the graying of Chinese culture" has advanced to the
digital world. ]n other words, Chinese Internet culture is becoming gray.
"Gray", according to Barme (1999, p. 100), is a syndrome that:
combined hopelessness, uncertainty, and ennui with irony, sarcasm, and a large dose
of fatalism. It was a mood that enveloped both the individual and an ambience that
suffused the urban world. It was a zeitgeist that was noticeably prevalent in youth
culture (Barme, 1999, p. 100).
The cultural T-shirt craze was a product of the "gray sentiment" of Chinese culture in the
I990s. In the twenty-first century it is blogging that represents the "graying" of Chinese
Internet culture. Embodied in the playful spirit of these bloggers, however, is not so
much hopelessness as confidence in their role as media consumer-cum-producers who
have the technical and cultural capacity to entertain themselves and the nation, both
Chinese and non-Chinese.
Geremie Barme used a statement from a Chinese official report on the cultural T-shirt
craze to summarise his survey on the "graying of Chinese culture" in the 1990s:
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The "gray culture shirts" have come and gone. Although this phenomenon has
disappeared, it does not mean that the "gray sentiments" harboured by certain
individuals have vanished. Who knows, next year they may discover some new
medium for expression (quoted in Barme, 1999, p. 142).
As this aJ1icle has demonstrated, "gray senliments" have migrated from the urban youth in the
capital city and China's metropolises to a wider community in the online world.]n this way the
]ntemet has become the new medium for expression of "gray sentiments". The colour "gray"
has characterised Chinese popular culture in the post-Mao era. The "graying" of Chinese
culture will continue to inform everyday life in the era of new media and communication tech-
nologies, in the form of mobile texting, online posting, blogging, and any new means or
medium that comes along.
Notes
I. Internet User Growth in China (June 2001 -June 2006) available at http://www.cnnic.col1l.cn/index/
OE/OO/ I I/index.htm.
2. A pun on the infamous "Great Leap Forward" from 1958 to 1962 under Mao's leadership.
3. 'A Hard Day's Night', available at http://www.koook.com/special/xiaoqiang/.
4. 'A Bloody Case Caused by a Steamed Bun', available at http://news.sohu.com/s2006/06m'lI1tou/.
Although the two blogger events startcd to enjoy great popularity and publicily in the first days of
January 2006, they were produced in 2005 and derived from the socio-cultural context of 2005. It is
therefore justifiablc to view them as outreach of 2005 blogger events.
5. Now Mu Zimei has shiftcd to podcasting. Although quite notorious and controvcrsial shc still cnjoys
media attcntion and hcr podcasting attracts around 10,000 visits a day. Mu Zimci has opened sevcral
bJogs at different websitcs. Hcr blog at blogcn.com is muzimei.blogcn.com/indcx.shml.
6. A research article by Chinalabs.com (established by Fang Xingdong and Wang Junxiu. foundcrs of blog-
china.com, in 1999) dcfincs four singes in the growth of blogging in lhe glohal blogosphere: thc incu-
bation singe, the inilial growth stage (led by the intcllectual elite). the popularisation stage, and the
mature stagc (http:f /news.xinhuanct.com/newmedia/2006-02/ I4/content_4 I74072.htm). Although
blogging has become a popular cultural phenomenon in China, I think it is still in its popularising
and developmental stage, cspecially considering the number of bloggers (compared with the numbcr
of Chinese Intcrnetusers and China's total population) and their concentration in urhan and coastal areas.
7. See 'Growth of Chinese Bloggers 2003-2007'. Available at http://news.xinhuanct.com/newmedia/
2006-02/14/content_4174072.htl11.
8. Interestingly, these bloggers all work in the mcdia industry as journalists, editors, photographers or free-
lance writers. They blog online and form an informal blogger salon offline. As hloggers, they use a differ-
ent writing style and language from those they cmploy in writing for their bosses. The topic of hlogging
and its impact on traditional media and journalism in the Chinese context deserves further study. It is not
the central Insk of this article. however. to address the issue in detail.
9. For example, one "mlill/Oll" fan wrote: "If Chen Kaige finds trouble with you, notify us immediately al
tianya.eom; if Chen Kaigc throws a tantrum at you, we'll all hc there to protect you" (http://yule.sohu.
com/200602I 3/n2277549D6.shtml).
ID. Jiang Zeming's "Three Represents" philosophy is a redefinition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCI')
away from ilS original roots as the avant-gardc party of the prolelnriat. Jiang's new philosophy goes as
follows: thc CCI' represents the demands of adval1l:ed productive forces: the CCI' represents thc pro-
motion of advanced culture: the CCI' represents thc hasic interests of the hroao masses of lhe people.
Jiang's succcssor 1·lu Jinlao has takcn on thc "torch" of the "Thrcc Represents" ano adoco a "human
face" to it. Hu's "Thrcc Closenesses" refcr to "close to reality, close to the masses, ano close to lifc".
II. This is a pun on thc common Maoist exprcssion "politics is in comnHlllo".
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